In the last couple of years, several adversarial attack methods based on different threat models have been proposed for the image classification problem. Most existing defenses consider additive threat models in which sample perturbations have bounded L p norms. These defenses, however, can be vulnerable against adversarial attacks under non-additive threat models. An example of an attack method based on a non-additive threat model is the Wasserstein adversarial attack proposed by Wong et al. (2019) , where the distance between an image and its adversarial example is determined by the Wasserstein metric ("earth-mover distance") between their normalized pixel intensities. Until now, there has been no certifiable defense against this type of attack. In this work, we propose the first defense with certified robustness against Wasserstein Adversarial attacks using randomized smoothing. We develop this certificate by considering the space of possible flows between images, and representing this space such that Wasserstein distance between images is upper-bounded by L 1 distance in this flow-space. We can then apply existing randomized smoothing certificates for the L 1 metric. In MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we find that our proposed defense is also practically effective, demonstrating significantly improved accuracy under Wasserstein adversarial attack compared to unprotected models.
Introduction
In recent years, adversarial attacks against machine learning systems, and defenses against these attacks, have been heavily studied (Szegedy et al., 2013; Madry et al., 2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017) . Although these attacks have been applied in a variety of domains, image classification tasks remain a major focus of research. In general, for a specified image classifier f , the goal of an adversarial attack on an image x is to produce a perturbed imagex that is imperceptibly 'close' to x, such that f classifiesx differently than x. This 'closeness' notion can be measured in a variety of different ways under different threat models. Most existing attacks and defenses consider additive threat models where the L p norm ofx − x is bounded.
Recently, non-additive threat models (Wong et al., 2019; Laidlaw and Feizi, 2019; Engstrom et al., 2019; Assion et al., 2019) have been introduced which aim to minimize the distance between x andx according to other metrics. Among these attacks is the attack introduced by Wong et al. (2019) which considers the Wasserstein distance between x andx, normalized such that the pixel intensities of the image can be treated as probability distributions. Informally, the Wasserstein distance between probability distributions x andx measures the minimum cost to 'transport' probability mass in order to transform x intox, where the cost scales with both the amount of mass transported and the distance over which it is transported with respect to some underlying metric. The intuition behind this threat model is that shifting pixel intensity a short distance across an image is less perceptible than moving the same amount of pixel intensity a larger distance (See Figure 1 for an example of a Wasserstein adversarial attack.)
A variety of practical approaches have been proposed to make classifiers robust against adversarial attack including adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) , defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016) , and obfuscated gradients . However, as Figure 1 : An illustration of Wasserstein adversarial attack (Wong et al., 2019) . new defenses are proposed, new attack methodologies are often rapidly developed which defeat these defences (Tramèr et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini and Wagner, 2016) . While updated defences are often then proposed (Tramèr et al., 2017) , in general, we cannot be confident that new attacks will not in turn defeat these defences.
To escape this cycle, approaches have been proposed to develop certifiably robust classifiers (Wong and Kolter, 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Lecuyer et al., 2019; Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019) : in these classifiers, for each image x, one can calculate a radius ρ such that it is provably guaranteed that any other imagex with distance less than ρ from x will be classified similarly to x. This means that no adversarial attack can ever be developed which produces adversarial examples to the classifier within the certified radius.
One effective approach to develop certifiably robust classification is to use randomized smoothing with a probabilistic robustness certificate (Lecuyer et al., 2019; Li et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019) . In this approach, one uses a smoothed classifier f (x), which represents the expectation of f (x) over random perturbations of x. Based on this smoothing, one can derive an upper bound on how steeply the scores assigned to each class byf can change, which can then be used to derive a radius ρ in which the highest class score must remain highest 1 .
In this work, we present the first certified defence against Wasserstein adversarial attacks using an adapted randomized smoothing approach, which we call Wasserstein smoothing. To develop the robustness certificate, we define a (non-unique) representation of the difference between two images, based on the flow of pixel intensity necessary to construct one im-1 In practice, samples are used to estimate the expectation f (x), producing an empirical smoothed classifierf (x): the certification is therefore probabilistic, with a degree of certainty dependent on the number of samples. age from another. In this representation, we show that the L 1 norm of the minimal flow between two images is equal to the Wasserstein distance between the images. This allows us to apply existing L 1 smoothing-based defences, by adding noise in the space of these representations of flows. We show that empirically that this gives improved robustness certificates, compared to using a weak upper bound of Wasserstein distance given by randomized smoothing in the feature space of images directly. We also show that our Wasserstein smoothing defence protects against Wasserstein adversarial attacks empirically, with significantly improved robustness compared to baseline models. For small adversarial perturbations on the MNIST dataset, our method achieves higher accuracy under adversarial attack than all existing practical defences for the Wasserstein threat model.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We develop a novel certified defence for the Wasserstein adversarial attack threat model. This is the first certified defence, to our knowledge, that has been proposed for this threat model.
• We demonstrate that our certificate is nonvacuous, in that it can certify Wasserstein radii larger than those which can be certified by exploiting a trivial L 1 upper bound on Wasserstein distance.
• We demonstrate that our defence effectively protects against existing Wasserstein adversarial attacks, compared to an unprotected baseline.
Background
Let x ∈ [0, 1] n×m denote a two dimensional image, of height n and width m. We will normalize the image such that ∑ i ∑ j x i,j = 1, so that x can be interpreted as a probability distribution on the discrete support of pixel coordinates of the two-dimensional image. 2 Following the notation of Wong et al. (2019) , we define the p-Wasserstein distance between x and x ′ as: 
2 In the case of multi-channel color images, the attack proposed by Wong et al. (2019) does not transport pixel intensity between channels. This allows us to defend against these attacks using our 2D Wasserstein smoothing with little modification. See Section 6.3, and Corollary 2 in the appendix C (i,j),(i ′ ,j ′ ) is the cost of transporting a mass unit from the position (i, j) to (i ′ , j ′ ) in the image.
Note that, for the purpose of matrix multiplication, we are treating x, x ′ as vectors of length nm. Similarly, the transport plan matrix Π and the cost matrix C are in R nm×nm .
Intuitively, Π (i,j),(i ′ ,j ′ ) represents the amount of probability mass to be transported from pixel (i, j) to (i ′ , j ′ ), while C (i,j),(i ′ ,j ′ ) represents the cost per unit probability mass to transport this probability. We can choose d(., .) to be any measure of distance between pixel positions in an image. For example, in order to represent the L 1 distance metric between pixel positions, we can choose:
Moreover, to represent the L 2 distance metric between pixel positions, we can choose:
Our defence directly applies to the 1-Wasserstein metric using the L 1 distance as the metric d(., .), while the attack developed by Wong et al. (2019) uses the L 2 distance. However, because images are two dimensional, these differ by at most a constant factor of √ 2, so we adapt our certificates to the setting of Wong et al. (2019) by simply scaling our certificates by 1 √ 2. All experimental results will be presented with this scaling. We emphasize that this it not the distinction between 1-Wasserstein and 2-Wasserstein distances: this paper uses the 1-Wasserstein metric, to match the majority of the experimental results of Wong et al. (2019) .
To develop our certificate, we rely an alternative linear program formulation for the 1-Wasserstein distance on a two-dimensional image with the L 1 distance metric, provided by Ling and Okada (2007) :
where g ≥ 0 and ∀(i, j),
Here, N (i, j) denotes the (up to) four immediate (nondiagonal) neighbors of the position (i, j); in other words,
For the L 1 distance in two dimensions, Ling and Okada (2007) prove that this formulation is in fact equivalent to the linear program given in Equation 1. Note that only elements of g with i − i ′ + j − j ′ = 1 need to be defined: this means that the number of variables in the linear program is approximately 4nm, compared to the n 2 m 2 elements of Π in Equation 1. While this was originally used to make the linear program more tractable to be solved directly, we exploit the form of this linear program to devise a randomized smoothing scheme in the next section.
Robustness Certificate
In order to present our robustness certificate, we first introduce some notation. Let δ = {δ vert. ∈ R (n−1)×m , δ horiz. ∈ R n×(m−1) } denote a local flow plan. It specifies a net flow between adjacent pixels in an image x, which, when applied, transforms x to a new image x ′ . See Figure 2 for an explanation of the indexing. For compactness, we write δ ∈ R r where r = (n − 1)m + n(m − 1) ≈ 2nm, and in general refer to the space of possible local flow plans as the flow domain. We define the function ∆, which applies a local flow to a distribution.
Definition 3.1. The local flow plan application function ∆ ∈ R n×m × R r → R n×m is defined as:
where we let δ vert. 0,j = δ vert. n,j = δ horiz.
Note that local flow plans are additive:
Using this notation, we make a simple transformation of the linear program given in Equation 4, removing the positivity constraint from the variables and reducing the number of variables to ∼ 2nm:
Lemma 1. For any normalized probability distributions x, x ′ ∈ [0, 1] n×m :
where W 1 denotes the 1-Wasserstein metric, using the L 1 distance as the underlying distance metric d.
In other words, we can upper-bound the Wasserstein distance between two images using the L 1 norm of any feasible local flow plan between the two images. This enables us to extend existing results for L 1 smoothingbased certificates (Lecuyer et al., 2019) to the Wasserstein metric, by adding noise in the flow domain.
Definition 3.2. We denote by L(σ) = Laplace(0, σ) r as the Laplace noise with parameter σ in the flow domain of dimension r. Given a classification score function f ∶ R n×m → [0, 1] k , we definef as the Wasserstein-smoothed classification function as follows:
Let i be the class assignment of x using the Wasserstein-smoothed classifierf (i.e. i = arg max i ′f i ′ (x)).
Theorem 1. For any normalized probability distribu-
then for any perturbed probability distributionx such that W 1 (x,x) ≤ ρ, we have:
All proofs are presented in the appendix.
Intuition: One-Dimensional Case
To provide an intuition about the proposed Wasserstein smoothing certified robustness scheme, we consider a simplified model, in which the support of x is a one-dimensional array of length n, rather than a two-dimensional grid (i.e. x ∈ R n ). In this case, we can denote a local flow plan δ ∈ R n−1 , so that for
where δ 0 = δ n = 0. In this one-dimensional case, for any fixed x, x ′ (with the normalization constraint that x xr r xxF igure 3: An illustrative example in one dimension. r (black) denotes a fixed reference distribution. With this starting distribution fixed, x (red) andx (blue) can both be uniquely represented in the flow domain as δ x and δx. Note that the Wasserstein distance between x andx is then equivalent to the L 1 distance between δ x and δx. In the one-dimensional case, this shows that we can transform the samples into a space where the Wasserstein threat model is equivalent to the L 1 metric. We can then use a pre-existing L 1 certified defence in the flow space to defend our classifier.
Note at this reminds us a well-known identity describing optimal transport between two distributions X, Y which share a continuous, one-dimensional support (see section 2.6 of Peyré et al. (2019) , for example):
where F X , F Y denote cumulative density functions. If we apply this result to our discretized case, with the index i taking the place of z, and apply the identity to
x and x ′ , this becomes:
By the uniqueness of the solution given in Equation 12, for any x, we can define δ x as the solution to x = ∆(r, δ), where r is an arbitrary fixed reference distribution (e.g. suppose r 1 = 1, r i = 0 for i ≠ 1). Therefore, instead of operating on the images x,x ∈ R n directly, we can equivalently operate on δ x and δx in the flow domain instead. We will therefore define a flow-domain version of our classifier f :
We will now perform classification entirely in the flow-domain, by first calculating δ x and then using f flow (δ x ) as our classifier. Now, consider x and an adversarial perturbationx, and let δ be the unique solution tox = ∆(x, δ). By equation 14, δ 1 = W 1 (x,x).
Then:
where the second equality is by equation 6. Moreover, by the uniqueness of Equation
In other words, if we classify in the flow-domain, using f flow , the L 1 distance between point δ x , δx is the Wasserstein distance between the distributions x and x. Then, we can perform smoothing in the flowdomain, and use the existing L 1 robustness certificate provided by Lecuyer et al. (2019) , to certify robustness. Extending this argument to two-dimensional images adds some complication: images can no longer be represented uniquely in the flow domain, and the relationship between L 1 distance and the Wasserstein distance is now an upper bound. Nevertheless, the same conclusion still holds for 2D images as we state in Theorem 1. Proofs for the two-dimensional case are given in the appendix.
Practical Certification Scheme
To generate probabilistic robustness certificates from randomly sampled evaluations of the base classifier f , we adapt the procedure outlined by Cohen et al. (2019) for L 2 certificates. We consider a hard smoothed classifier approach: we set f j (x) = 1 if the base classifier selects class j at point x, and f j (x) = 0 otherwise. We also use a stricter form of the condition given as Equation 9:f
This means that we only need to provide a probabilistic lower bound of the expectation of the largest class score, rather than bounding every class score. This reduces the number of samples necessary to estimate a high-confidence lower bound onf i (x), and therefore to estimate the certificate with high confidence. Cohen et al. (2019) provides a statistically sound procedure for this, which we use: refer to that paper for details. Note that, when simply evaluating the classification given byf (x), we will also need to approximatef using random samples. Cohen et al. (2019) also provides a method to do this which yields the expected classification with high confidence, but may abstain from classifying. We will also use this method when evaluating accuracies.
Since the Wasserstein adversarial attack introduced by Wong et al. (2019) uses the L 2 distance metric, to have a fair performance evaluation against this attack, we are interested in certifying a radius in the 1-Wasserstein distance with underlying L 2 distance metric, rather than L 1 . Let us denote this radius as ρ 2 . In two-dimensional images, the elements of the cost matrix C in this metric may be smaller by up to a factor of √ 2, so we have:
Therefore, by certifying to a radius of ρ = √ 2ρ 2 , we can effectively certify against the L 2 metric 1-Wasserstein attacks of radius ρ 2 ; our condition then becomes:
(20)
Experimental Results
In all experiments, we use 10,000 random noised samples to predict the smoothed classification of each image; to generate certificates, we first use 1000 samples to infer which class has highest smoothed score, and then 10,000 samples to lower-bound this score. All probabilistic certificates and classifications are reported to 95% confidence. The model architectures used for the base classifiers for each data set are the same as used in Wong et al. (2019) . When reporting results, median certified accuracy refers to the maximum radius ρ 2 such that at least 50% of classifications for images in the data set are certified to be robust to at least this radius, and these certificates are for the correct ground truth class. If over 50% of images are not certified for the correct class, this statistic is reported as N A.
Comparison to naive Laplace Smoothing
Note that one can derive a trivial but sometimes tight bound, that, under any L p distance metric, if the appendix.) This enables us to write a condition for ρ 2 -radius Wasserstein certified robustness by applying Laplace smoothing directly, and simply converting the certificate. In our notation, this condition is:
wheref Laplace (x) is a smoothed classifier with Laplace noise added to every pixel independently. It may appear as if our Wasserstein-smoothed bound should only be an improvement over this bound by a factor of √ 2 in the certified radius ρ 2 . However, as shown in Table 1 , we in fact improve our certificates by a larger factor. This is because, for a fixed noise standard deviation, the base classifier is able to achieve a higher accuracy after adding noise in the flow-domain, compared to adding noise directly to the pixels. When adding noise in the flow-domain, we add and subtract noise in equal amounts between adjacent pixels, preserving more information for the base classifier.
To give a concrete example, consider some k ×k square patch of an image. Suppose that the overall aggregate pixel intensity in this patch (i.e. the sum of the pixel values) is a salient feature for classification (This is a highly plausible situation: for example, in MNIST, this may indicate whether or not some region of an image is occupied by part of a digit.) Let us call this feature µ, and calculate the variance of µ in smoothing samples under Laplace and Wasserstein smoothing, both with variance σ 2 . Under Laplace smoothing (Figure 4-a) , k 2 independent instances of Laplace noise are added to µ, so the resulting variance will be k 2 σ 2 : this is proportional to the area of the region. In the case of Wasserstein smoothing, by contrast, probability mass exchanged between between pixels in the interior of the patch has no effect on the aggregate quantity µ. Instead, only noise on the perimeter will affect the total feature value µ: the variance is therefore 4kσ 2 (Figure 4-b) . Wasserstein smoothing then reduces the effective noise variance on the feature µ by a factor of O(k).
Empirical adversarial accuracy
We measure the performance of our smoothed classifier against the Wasserstein-metric adversarial attack proposed in Wong et al. (2019) , and compare to models tested in that work. Results are presented in Figure  5 . For testing, we use the same attack parameters as in Wong et al. (2019) : the 'Standard" and 'Adversarial Training' results are therefore replications of the experiments from that paper, using the publicly available code and pretrained models.
In order to attack our hard smoothed classifier, we adapt the method proposed by Salman et al. (2019) : in particular, note that we cannot directly calculate the gradient of the classification loss with respect to the image for a hard smoothed classifier, because the derivatives of the logits of the base classifier are not propagated. Therefore, we must instead attack a soft smooth classifier: we take the expectation over samples of the softmaxed logits of the base classifier, instead of the final classification output. In each step of the attack, we use 128 noised samples to estimate this See the text of Section 6.1. In both figures, pixels are represented as square tiles. In (a), noise on individual pixels is represented with circles, which are gray if they do not contribute to the overall pixel intensity in the outlined region, but are cyan if they do contribute. We see that the noise is proportional (in variance) to the area of the region. In (b), under Wasserstein smoothing, noise is represented by arrows between pixels which exchange intensity. Again, these are gray if they do not contribute to the overall pixel intensity in the outlined region, and cyan if they do contribute. Note that arrows in the interior do not contribute to the aggregate intensity, because equal values are added and subtracted from adjacent pixels. The noise is proportional (in variance) to the perimeter of the region. This provides a plausible intuition as to why base classifiers, when given noisy images, classify with higher accuracy on Wasserstein smoothed images compared to Laplace smoothed images, as seen empirically in Table 1. gradient, as used in Salman et al. (2019) .
In the attack proposed by Wong et al. (2019) , the images are attacked over 200 iterations of projected gradient descent, projected onto a Wasserstein ball, with the radius of the ball every 10 iterations. The attack succeeds, and the final radius is recorded, once the classifier misclassifies the image. In order to preserve as much of the structure (and code) of the attack as possible to provide a fair comparison, it is thus necessary for us to evaluate each image using our hard classifier, with the full 10,000 smoothing samples, at each iteration of the attack. We count the classifier abstaining as a misclassification for these experiments. However, note that this may somewhat underestimate the true robustness of our classifier: recall that our classifier is nondeterministic; therefore, because we are repeatedly evaluating the classifier and reporting a perturbed image as adversarial the first time it is missclassified, we may tend to over-count misclassifications. However, because we are using a large number of noise samples to generate our classifications, this is only likely to happen with examples which are close to being adversarial. Still, the presented data should be regarded as a lower bound on the true accuracy under attack of our Wasserstein smoothed classifier.
In Figure 5 , we note two things: first, our Wasserstein smoothing technique appears to be an effective empirical defence against Wasserstein adversarial attacks, compared to an unprotected ('Standard') network. (It is also more robust than the binarized and L ∞ -robust models tested by Wong et al. (2019) : see appendix.) However, for large perturbations, our defence is less effective than the adversarial training defence proposed by Wong et al. (2019) . This suggests a promising direction for future work: Salman et al. (2019) proposed an adversarial training method for smoothed classifiers, which could be applied in this case. Note however that both Wasserstein adversarial attacks and smoothed adversarial training are computationally expensive, so this may require significant Figure 5: Comparison of empirical robustness on MNIST to models from (Wong et al., 2019) . Wasserstein smoothing with σ = 0.01 (This is the amount of noise which maximizes certified robustness, as seen in Table 1.) computational resources. Second, the median radius of attack to which our smoothed classifier is empirically robust is larger than the median certified robustness of our smoothed classifier by two orders of magnitude. This calls for future work both to develop improved robustness certificates as well as to develop more effective attacks in the Wasserstein metric.
Experiments on color images (CIFAR-10)
Wong et al. (2019) also apply their attack to color images in CIFAR-10. In this case, the attack does not transport probability mass between color channels: therefore, in our defence, it is sufficient to add noise in the flow domain to each channel independently to certify robustness (See Corollary 2 in the appendix for a proof of the validity of this method). Certificates are presented in Table 2 , while empirical robustness is as Figure 6 . Again, we compare directly to models from Wong et al. (2019) . We note that again, empirically, our model significantly outperforms an unprotected model, but is not as robust as a model trained adversarially. We also note that the certified robust- Figure 6 : Comparison of empirical robustness on CIFAR-10 to models from (Wong et al., 2019) . Wasserstein smoothing is with σ = 0.0002. (This is the amount of noise which maximizes certified robustness, as seen in Table 2 .) Note that we test on a random sample of 1000 images from CIFAR-10, rather than the entire data set.
ness is orders of magnitude smaller than computed for MNIST: however, the unprotected model is also significantly less robust empirically than the equivalent MNIST model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a smoothing-based certifiably robust defence for Wasserstein-metric adversarial examples. To do this, we add noise in the space of possible flows of pixel intensity between images. To our knowledge, this is the first certified defence method specifically tailored to the Wasserstein threat model. Our method proves to be an effective practical defence against Wasserstein adversarial attacks, with significantly improved empirical adversarial robustness compared to a baseline model.
A Proofs
Lemma 1. For any normalized probability distributions x, x ′ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , there exists at least one δ such that x ′ = ∆(x, δ). Furthermore:
Where W 1 denotes the 1-Wasserstein metric, using L 1 distance as the underlying distance metric.
Proof. We first show the equivalence of the above minimization problem with the linear program proposed by Ling and Okada (2007) , restated here:
It suffices to show that (1) there is a transformation from the variables g in Equation 23 is less than or equal to the minimization objective in Equation 22. We start with (1). We give the transformation as:
Where we let g (n,j),(n+1,j) = g (n+1,j),(n,j) = g (i,m+1),(i,m) = g (i,m),(i,m+1) = 0. To show feasibility, we write out fully the flow constraint of Equation 23:
Substituting in Equation 24
:
But by Definition 3.1, this is exactly:
Which is the sole constraint in Equation 22: then any solution which is feasible in Equation 23 is feasible in Equation 22. Also note that:
Where the inequality follows from triangle inequality applied to Equation 24, and in the second sum in the fourth line, we exploit the fact that g (n,j),(n+1,j) = g (n+1,j),(n,j) = g (i,m+1),(i,m) = g (i,m),(i,m+1) = 0 to shift indices. This shows that the minimization objective in Equation 22 is less than or equal to the minimization objective in Equation 23. Moving on to (2), we give the transformation as:
Note that the non-negativity constraint of Equation 23 is automatically satisfied by the form of these definitions. Shifting indices, we also have:
From the constraint on Equation 22, we have:
Which is exactly the second constraint of Equation 23: then any solution which is feasible in Equation 23 is feasible in Equation 22. Also note that:
Where we again exploit the fact that g (n,j),(n+1,j) = g (n+1,j),(n,j) = g (i,m+1),(i,m) = g (i,m),(i,m+1) = 0 to shift indices, in the fourth line. This shows that the minimization objective in Equation 23 is less than or equal to the minimization objective in Equation 22, completing (2). Finally, now that we have shown that Equations 22 and 23 are in fact equivalent minimizations (i.e., we have proven Equation 22 correct), we would like to show that there is always a feasible solution to 22, as claimed. By the above transformations, it suffices to show that there is always a feasible solution to Equation 23. Ling and Okada (2007) show that any feasible solution the the general Wasserstein minimization LP (Definition 1) can be transformed into a solution to Equation 23, so it suffices to show that the LP in Definition 1 always has a feasible solution. This is trivially satisfied by taking Π = x(x ′ ) T , where we note that x, a probability distribution, is non-negative.
Theorem 1. Consider a normalized probability distribution x ∈ [0, 1] n×m , and a classification score function f ∶ R n×m → [0, 1] k . Letf refer to the Wassersteinsmoothed classification function:
Let i be the class assignment of x using the smoothed classifierf (i.e. i = arg max i ′f i ′ (x)). If
Then for any perturbed probability distributionx such that W 1 (x,x) ≤ ρ:f
Proof. Let u be the uniform probability vector. As a consequence of Lemma 1, for any distribution x, there exists a nonempty set of local flow plans S x :
Also, we may define a version of the classifier f on the local flow plan domain:
Let δ x be an arbitrary element in S x , and consider any perturbedx such that W 1 (x,x) ≤ ρ. By Theorem 1:
Then, using Equation 6: min δ∶x=∆(u,δx+δ)
Let the minimum be achieved at δ * . Making a change of variables (δx = δ * + δ x ), we have:
Note that for any x ′ (for δ ′ ∼ L(σ)) :
We can now apply Proposition 1 from Lecuyer et al. (2019) , restated here:
Proposition. Consider a vector v ∈ R d , and a classification score function h ∶ R d → [0, 1] k . Let ∼ Laplace(0, σ) d , and let i be the class assignment of v using a Laplace-smoothed version of the classifier h:
Which was to be proven.
Corollary 1. For any normalized probability distributions x,
where W 1 is the 1-Wasserstein metric using any L p norm as the underlying distance metric. Furthermore, there exist distributions where these inequalities are tight.
Proof. Let Π indicate the optimal transport plan between x and x ′ . From Definition 1, we have Π1 = x and Π T 1 = x ′ . Then:
Let Π ′ represent a modified version of Π, with the diagonal elements set to zero. Note that < Π ′ , C >=< Π, C > and Π T − Π = (Π ′ ) T − Π ′ . Then, using triangle inequality:
Because the elements of Π ′ are non-negative, this is simply:
Then, because the (non-diagonal) elements of C are at least 1 for any L p norm, we have,
which was to be proven. Note that this inequality can be tight. For example, let x be the distribution where the entire probability mass is at position (i, j), and x ′ be the distribution where the probability mass is equally split between at positions (i, j) and (i + 1, j). (In other words, x (i,j) = 1, x ′ (i,j) = .5, x ′ (i+1,j) = .5). In this case,
Corollary 2. Consider a color image with three chan-
. Let W 1 (x,x) denote the 1-Wasserstein distance (with L 1 distance metric) between x andx, where, when determining the minimum transport plan, transport between channels is not permitted. Using this definition, let W 1 (x,x) ≤ ρ. Define:
and let L color (σ) represent independent draws of Laplace noise each with standard deviation σ in the shape of δ. Then if
Proof. Let the mass in each channel be denoted s K :
Consider the formulation of Wasserstein distance given in Definition 1. If we represent the elements of x as a vector by concatenating the elements of δ R , δ G , and δ B , then the restriction that there is no flow between channels amounts to the requirement that Π is blockdiagonal:
Let C 1,1 represent the standard cost matrix for 1-Wasserstein transport (with L 1 distance metric). Because the cost of transport within each channel is the same for standard 1-Wasserstein transport (with L 1 distance metric), we have:
Then we have:
57) And by Equation 55, the constraints also factorize out:
Then the variables of each Π K are separable (in that they appear together in the objective only in the sum and share no constraints). We can then factorize the minimization:
We can transform each x K into a normalized probability distribution by scaling it by a factor of 1 s K . We similarly scale each Π K :
x K sc. ∶=
∀K, Π K sc. 1 = x K sc. , (Π K sc. ) T 1 =x K sc. (64)
But note that this is simply:
By Lemma 1, this is:
By the linearity to scaling of ∆ and the L 1 norm, this is simply:
Which, by Equation 51, is simply,
Then all of the mechanics of the proof of Theorem 1 apply, and (avoiding unnecessary repetition), we conclude the result. Table 1 .)
In addition to proposing adversarial training as a defence against Wasserstein Adversarial attacks, Wong et al. (2019) also tests other defences. On MNIST, binarization of the input and using a provably L ∞ -robust classifier were also tested as defences: our randomized smoothing method is more effective than these methods at all attack magnitudes (see Figure 7) . On CIFAR-10, Wong et al. (2019) only tested a provably L ∞ -robust classifier as an additional defence: unfortunately, code was not provided for this model, so we did not attempt to replicate the results.
C Training Parameters
In this paper, network architectures models used were identical to those used in Wong et al. (2019) . Unless stated otherwise, all parameters of attacks are the same as used in that paper for each data set. For training smoothed models, we train the base classifier using standard cross-entropy loss on individual noised sample images, using the same noise distribution as used when performing smoothed classification. However, during training, rather than using the same image repeatedly while adding different noise (as at test time), we instead train with each image only once per epoch, with one noise draw. In fact, for computational efficiency and as suggested by Lecuyer et al. (2019) , we re-use the same noise for each image in a batch. Training parameters are as follows (Tables  3, 4) : 
